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Abstract 
Our goal is to understand and build comprehensive agents that function effectively in 
challenging niches. In particular, we identify a class of niches to be occupied by “adaptive 
intelligent systems (AL%)“. In contrast with niches occupied by typical AI agents, AIS 
niches present situations that vary dynamically along several key dimensions: different 
combinations of required tasks, different configurations of available resources, contextual 
conditions ranging from benign to stressful, and different performance criteria. We present 
a small class hierarchy of AIS niches that exhibit these dimensions of variability and 
describe a particular AIS niche, ICU (intensive care unit) patient monitoring, which we 
use for illustration throughout the paper. To function effectively throughout the range of 
situations presented by an AIS niche, an agent must be highly adaptive. In contrast with 
the rather stereotypic behavior of typical AI agents, an AIS must adapt several key aspects 
of its behavior to its dynamic situation: its perceptual strategy, its control mode, its choices 
of reasoning tasks to perform, its choices of reasoning methods for performing chosen 
tasks; and its meta-control strategy for global coordination of all its behavior. We have 
designed and implemented an agent architecture that supports all of these different kinds 
of adaptation by exploiting a single underlying theoretical concept: An agent dynamically 
constructs explicit control plans to guide its choices among situation-triggered behaviors. The 
architecture has been used to build experimental agents for several AIS niches. We 
illustrate the architecture and its support for adaptation with examples from Guardian, an 
experimental agent for ICU monitoring. 
1. Toward more comprehensive AI agents 
“Intelligent agents” continuously perform three functions: perception of 
dynamic conditions in the environment; action to affect conditions in the 
environment; and reasoning to interpret perceptions, solve problems, draw 
inferences, and determine actions. Conceptually, perception informs reasoning 
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and reasoning guides action, although in some cases perception may drive action 
directly. This abstract definition allows for a great variety of biological and 
artificial agents whose capabilities range from extremely limited and stereotyped 
behavior to extremely sophisticated and versatile behavior. Why should different 
agents exhibit different behavioral capabilities and what underlies these differ- 
ences? 
Differences in their behavioral capabilities allow different classes of agents to 
function effectively in different niches. A “niche” is a class of operating 
environments: the tasks an agent must perform, the resources it has for 
performing tasks, the contextual conditions that may influence its performance, 
and the evaluation criteria it must satisfy. Human beings are the most sophisti- 
cated existing agents. Given their broad range of potential behavior, individual 
human beings can function effectively in many challenging niches. By contrast, 
typical AI agents are extremely limited. Given their narrow range of potential 
behavior, individual agents can function effectively only in a small number 
(usually one) of severely restricted (usually highly engineered) niches. 
We hypothesize that, to a large degree, an agent’s architecture determines its 
potential behavior and, therefore, the niches in which it potentially can function: 
Agent Architecture 3 Potential Behavior 3 Suitable Niches. 
By “architecture” we mean the abstract design of a class of agents: the set of 
structural components in which perception, reasoning, and action occur, the 
specific functionality and interface of each component, and the interconnection 
topology among components. Under this hypothesis, human beings function 
effectively in many niches that no other animal or existing AI agent could 
fill&-certainly because only human beings have acquired the necessary knowledge 
and skills, but more fundamentally because only the complex and powerful 
architecture embodied in the human nervous system [3] supports such a broad 
range of knowledge and skills. 
Conversely, to function effectively in a particular niche, an agent must exhibit 
the range of behavior required in that niche and, therefore, must have an 
architecture that supports the required behavior: 
Intended Niche + Required Behavior 3 Sufficient Architectures. 
Typical AI agents have simple architectures for good reason: simple architectures 
are sufficient to support the behavior required in their intended niches. In fact, 
for restricted niches, architecture often plays a relatively small role in an agent’s 
effectiveness, many alternative architectures may suffice, and architectural design 
is a relatively insignificant part of the agent-building enterprise. As the intended 
niche increases in complexity, however, architecture plays a larger role in the 
agent’s effectiveness, fewer alternative architectures will suffice, and architectural 
design becomes a more critical and expensive part of the agent-building en- 
terprise. 
Thus, we argue that present AI agents are “niche-bound” both because they 
are “knowledge-bound” [33] and because they are “architecture-bound”. Increas- 
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ing only agents’ knowledge can expand the very narrow niches in which they 
currently function. However, it will have diminishing returns as the intended 
niches increase in complexity and agents’ ability to exploit the necessary 
knowledge and skills runs up against architectural imitations. 
Our goal is to provide an architecture for more comprehensive AI agents that 
function effectively in more challenging niches. Thus, we are working very much 
in the spirit of Newell’s call for “unified theories of cognition” [37]; see also 
[2,32]. We focus on a class of “adaptive intelligent systems (AISs)“, which operate 
in a class of niches that is intermediate between the severely restricted niches of 
typical AI systems and the effectively unrestricted niches of human beings. As 
discussed below, AIS niches present dynamic variability in their required tasks, 
available resources, contextual conditions, and performance criteria. As a result, 
to function effectively in AIS niches, agents must possess a pervasive property of 
human behavior: adaptation. We have designed an agent architecture to support 
the several dimensions of adaptation required in AIS niches and used it to build 
experimental agents for several of the domain-specific niches in Fig. 1. To ground 
the discussion, we take examples throughout the paper from a particular niche, 
patient monitoring in an intensive care unit (ICU), and an experimental agent 
called Guardian [25,26], which was built with our agent architecture. 
Let us begin by using the ICU monitoring niche to illustrate important shared 
properties of AIS niches. Intensive care patients are critically ill and depend on 
life-support devices (e.g., a ventilator) to perform vital functions until their own 
impaired organs heal and resume normal function, usually a period of several 
days. The high-level goals of ICU monitoring are to wean the patient from the 
devices as soon as possible (to minimize cost, discomfort, and undesirable side 
effects), while detecting and treating any additional problems that arise along the 
way. Effective patient-management involves: interpretation of many continuous- 
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Fig. 1. Excerpt from the class hierarchy of AIS niches. 
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ly, periodically, or occasionally sensed physiological and device variables; plan- 
ning and comparative evaluation of many interacting therapy alternatives; 
detection, diagnosis, and correction of unanticipated problems; control of many 
patient-management and device-control parameters; and reporting and consulting 
on patient progress with other members of the ICU team. The complexity of ICU 
monitoring can overwhelm even skilled clinicians. 
As illustrated by ICU monitoring and summarized in Table 1, AIS niches are 
considerably more demanding than the niches occupied by typical AI agents. 
First, AIS niches require performance of several diverse tasks, sometimes concur- 
rently and often interacting. For example, ICU monitoring requires tasks such as 
condition monitoring, fault detection, diagnosis, and planning. Second, AIS 
niches provide variable resources for performing tasks. For example, Guardian has 
both associative and causal modeling methods for performing diagnosis tasks. It 
may or may not have the particular class hierarchies or causal relations needed to 
apply these methods to a given diagnosis problem. Third, AZS niches entail 
complex and variable contextual conditions. For example, in ICU monitoring 
there may be 100 variables sensed automatically several times per second (e.g., 
blood pressure, pulse), as well as other variables that are sensed irregularly (e.g., 
laboratory results, X-ray analyses). Data representing these variables differ in 
criticality and criticality is context-dependent. A patient may manifest several 
problems simultaneously and therapies for simultaneous problems may interact. 
Finally, AIS niches impose more qualitative performance criteria, replacing the 
usual correctness, efficiency, and completeness criteria with effectiveness, timeli- 
ness, and robustness. For example, if an ICU patient manifests several problems 
simultaneously, any critical problems must be treated well enough and soon 
enough to save the patient’s life, even if such treatment is sub-optimal and 
regardless of how many other problems go untreated. 
To function effectively in AIS niches, an agent must be highly adaptive (Table 
2): it must modify its behavior on each of several dimensions, depending on the 
situation in which it finds itself. First, an agent must adapt its perceptual strategy to 
dynamic information requirements and resource limitations. For example, when 
Guardian is monitoring a stable patient, it may divide its perceptual activities 
among all available patient data in order to maintain a good overview of the 
Table I 
Shared properties of AIS niches versus typical AI niches 
AIS niches Tvoical AI niches 
Required tasks 
Available resources 
Typical context 
Evaluation criteria 
Diverse. concurrent. interacting 
Variable methods, data, models, 
facts available 
Competing: 
Percepts, tasks. actions 
Effective, timely, robust 
Single isolated task 
Single correct method, relevant 
data, and appropriate model 
No competition 
Correct, efficient, complete 
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Table 2 
Behavioral adaptations required of an AIS versus the static behavior of a typical AI agent 
Perception strategy 
Required AIS adaptations 
Adapt to information requirements 
and resource limitations 
Typical AI agent behaviors 
Fixed 
Control mode 
Reasoning tasks 
Adapt to goal-based constraints 
and environmental uncertainty 
Adapt to perceived and inferred 
conditions 
Fixed 
Single task 
Reasoning methods Adapt to available information 
and current performance criteria 
Single reasoning method 
Meta-control strategy Adapt to dynamic configurations 
of demands and opportunities 
Unnecessary 
patient’s condition and remain vigilant to possible problems. However, when it 
detects a serious problem, Guardian must perceive more selectively, focusing on 
patient data that help it diagnose the problem and identify an appropriate 
therapeutic action in a timely manner. Second, an agent must adapt its control 
mode to dynamic goat-based constraints on its actions and uncertainty about its 
environment. For example, when the patient has a critical, but slowly evolving 
problem, Guardian can plan and execute an optimal course of therapeutic actions. 
However, when urgent conditions arise, Guardian must be prepared to react 
immediately. Third, an agent must adapt its choices among potential reasoning 
tasks to dynamic local and global objectives. For example, when Guardian is 
monitoring a stable patient, it need only track patient data. When it detects a 
problem, it must perform a diagnosis task, along with its ongoing monitoring task. 
After completing its diagnosis, it must perform a therapy planning task, along 
with its ongoing monitoring task. Fourth, an agent must adapt its reasoning 
methods to the currently available information and performance criteria. For 
example, Guardian can use clinical experience to recognize commonly occurring 
problems and select standard therapeutic responses. However, when faced with 
unfamiliar problems, it must fall back on models of the patient’s underlying 
pathophysiology to perform a more systematic diagnosis and design an appro- 
priate therapy. Finally, an agent must adapt its meta-control strategy to its dynamic 
conJiguration of demands, opportunities, and resources for behavior. For example, 
Guardian ordinarily interleaves several unrelated or loosely-coupled activities, but 
may decide to suspend competing activities if a critical problem arises. An 
effective meta-control strategy may emerge from Guardian’s independent deci- 
sions regarding co-occurring problems; in other cases it may decide to impose a 
particular meta-control strategy on a challenging configuration of competing 
demands and opportunities for behavior. 
We have designed and implemented an agent architecture to support the 
several forms of adaptation required of an AIS. It enables an agent to modify its 
perceptual strategy, its control mode, its reasoning tasks, its reasoning methods, 
and its meta-control strategy. depending on relevant features of its dynamic 
situation. Moreover, our architecture has an important theoretical strength, a 
kind of architectural parsimony. Its support for all five dimensions of adaptation 
derives from a fundamental theoretical concept and its architectural embodiment 
[20,22,23]: An agent dynamically constructs explicit control plans to guide its 
choices umong situation-triggered behaviors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our 
agent architecture. Sections 3-7 examine the requirements for each of the five 
dimensions of adaptation in more detail and show how our architecture supports 
them. Section 8 discusses evaluation of the architecture, summarizes the status of 
experimental agents built with the architecture, and contrasts the architecture 
with others in the literature. Section 9 presents conclusions. 
2. The agent architecture 
Our agent architecture (Fig. 2) hierarchically organizes component systems for 
perception, action. and cognition processes. Perception processes acquire, ab- 
stract, and filter sensed data before sending it to other components. Action 
systems control the execution of external actions on effecters. Perception can 
I Perception I I Action Fast Reflex Arcs 
Dynamic Environment 
Fig. 7. ‘I’hc agent ;rrchitecturc. 
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influence action directly through reflex arcs or through perception-action coordi- 
nation processes. The cognition systems interprets perceptions, solves problems, 
makes plans, and guides both perceptual strategies and external action. These 
processes operate concurrently and asynchronously. They communicate by 
message passing. Perception-action operations occur at least an order of mag- 
nitude faster than cognitive operations. 
The cognition system, which is the architecture’s most substantial component, is 
realized as a “blackboard architecture” [13], extended to support dynamic control 
planning [20,21,23]. For present purposes, we emphasize these features: (a) 
Perceptual inputs and internal reasoning operations produce changes to a global 
memory; (b) Each such event triggers some number of possible reasoning 
operations; (c) Possible operations are scheduled for execution based on active 
control plans; (d) Control plans are themselves constructed and modified by 
reasoning operations; (e) Possible actions and control plans are represented in an 
English-like machine-interpretable language that supports semantic partial match- 
ing of actions to plans. 
For example, here is one of Guardian’s reasoning operations for model-based 
diagnosis: 
Name: Find-Generic-Causes 
Trigger: Observe condition, C; where C exemplifies generic-fault, F 
Action: Find generic-faults that can-cause F 
Find-Generic-Causes is triggered and its parameters are instantiated whenever a 
prior reasoning operation indicates that a newly observed patient condition, C, 
“exemplifies” some generic-fault, F. For example, if C were a decrease in the 
patient’s urine output or inspired air, it would exemplify the generic-fault: 
decrease in the flow of a flow process. When executed, the action of this reasoning 
operation consults the factual knowledge base and identifies all generic-faults that 
“can-cause” F (e.g., blockage or leakage of an upstream flow structure can cause 
a decrease in the flow of a flow process). By recording each such possible cause in 
the global memory, this operation creates internal events that trigger other 
reasoning operations. For example, some triggered operations might instantiate 
possible generic causes with respect to the observed condition, C (e.g., blockage 
or leakage of various structures in the urinary or respiratory system). Others 
might continue the backward chaining to identify other generic-faults that “can- 
cause” those currently hypothesized. Others might attempt to discriminate among 
alternative hypotheses by examining relevant patient data. To perform a reason- 
ing task such as diagnosis, Guardian triggers and executes a sequence of such 
reasoning operations, under the control of an appropriate control strategy, 
incrementally building a solution to the diagnosis problem. 
Here is an example of Guardian’s control reasoning operations: 
Name: Respond-to-Urgent-Problem 
Trigger: Observe critical condition, C 
Action: Record control decision with 
Prescription: Quickly respond to C 
Criticality: Criticality of C 
Goal: Diagnosed problems related to C are corrected 
Respond-to-Urgent-Problem is triggered and its parameter, C. is instantiated 
whenever the perception system delivers an observed condition with a high 
criticality. When executed, it creates a control decision to quickly respond to the 
condition and gives this decision a priority that is proportional to the criticality of 
C. While active, this control decision focuses (some of) Guardian’s perception, 
reasoning (e.g., diagnosis and therapy planning), and action resources on 
activities related to quickly responding to C. For example, Respond-to-Urgent- 
Problem could produce a control decision to: Respond quickly to the observed 
decrease in the patient’s inspired air. To identify possible operations that 
semantically match its control plans, an agent uses explicit knowledge of its own 
competence as well as its domain: (a) type hierarchies of actions and domain 
concepts; (b) other relations among actions and concepts; and (c) attached 
procedures for evaluating modifiers of actions and concepts. Thus, continuing the 
present example, Guardian would favor execution of possible operations that 
“quickly” (fast. relative to other operations) “respond to” (monitor, diagnose, 
correct) the observed decrease in inspired air. A control decision is deactivated 
when its goal is achieved, in this case, when all diagnosed problems related to C 
have been corrected. Using a small set of general control reasoning operations to 
generate a variety of specific control decisions, an agent such as Guardian can 
construct control plans (including plans that have sequential or hierarchical 
structure) that are appropriate to its situation and it can change those plans as the 
situation changes [30]. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the characteristic behavior of agents implemented in this 
architecture with a simplified episode from Guardian’s monitoring of a simulated 
ICU patient. 
At the start of the episode, Guardian has two active control plans: plan A, to 
update the control plan whenever possible with priority 5; and plan B, to monitor 
patient data whenever possible with priority 3. Because patient data are always 
available, the perception system filters continuously sensed patient data and sends 
selected values to the cognition system at a manageable global data rate. These 
perceived patient data repeatedly trigger monitoring operations for several 
variables, including blood pressure and heart rate, all of which match plan B. No 
events trigger any operations that match plan A. Therefore, for a time, Guardian 
executes various monitoring operations. 
Soon, however, an executed monitoring operation reveals that the patient has 
abnormally low blood pressure. This observation triggers three new operations, 
one operation to update the control plan and two alternative operations to begin 
diagnosing the low blood pressure, all of which compete with recently triggered 
monitoring operations. Guardian chooses to update the control plan because that 
operation matches plan A, its highest priority active control plan. This operation 
produces control plan C, to respond quickly to the low blood pressure, with 
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Control Plan 
A. Update control plans -- P=5 
B. Monitor all patient data 
P=3 P=l P=3 
C. Quickly respond to low BP -- P=3 
Possible Actions - Top Row Chosen for Execution 
M:hrM:bp U:cp Dl:bp I:fi M:bp U:cp M: hr M:bp 
M:bp M:hr M: hr M:hr M: hr M:hr M:hr M: bp M:hr 
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Dl:bp DZ:bp 
D2:bp 
Time 
u = update pd = Patient Data P = Ririty 
M = Monitor bP = Blood Pns~~ 
I = Increase br = Heart Rate 
- = Active interval 
Dl = Diagnose Type 1 ti = Fluid Intake 
D2 = Diagnose Type 2 cp = ControlPlan 
Fig. 3. Illustrative Guardian reasoning behavior. 
priority 3, and lowers the priority of plan B to 1. As a result of the latter change, 
which is designed to focus resources on the more urgent blood pressure problem, 
the perception system filters sensed patient data more severely and sends values 
to the cognition system at a lower global data rate. 
Now Guardian executes a series of actions that match plan C, temporarily 
ignoring repeatedly triggered monitoring actions because of plan B’s lower 
priority. First, Guardian executes one of its pending diagnostic operations-types 
1 and 2-for diagnosing the observed low blood pressure. Although both 
diagnostic operations “respond to low blood pressure” and, therefore, match plan 
C, diagnosis type 1 matches better because it embodies a “quicker” diagnostic 
method. Although Fig. 3 abstracts Guardian’s diagnostic reasoning as a single 
executed action, in fact diagnosis involves execution of a sequence of reasoning 
operations. The result of each operation triggers the next, until the last operation 
identifies the cause of the high blood pressure, in this case low fluid intake. 
Identification of this underlying fault triggers an operation to take corrective 
action (via the action subsystem) by increasing the patient’s fluid intake. Guardian 
executes this operation and, in so doing, triggers an operation to monitor blood 
pressure, which it expects to rise. This is the last operation Guardian executes 
under plan C. (Although this simple example involves only a single corrective 
action, Guardian is capable of performing several corrective actions in parallel- 
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coordinated actions to address a single problem or separate actions to address 
different problems.) 
Confirmation of normal blood pressure indicates that the goal of plan C has 
been achieved, which triggers a new operation to update the control plan. 
Guardian executes this operation because it matches plan A, the highest priority 
active plan. It deactivates Plan C and returns the priority of Plan B to 3. As a 
result, the perception system filters sensed patient data less severely and sends 
values to the cognition system at its original higher global data rate. Guardian 
returns to executing monitoring operations repeatedly triggered by perceived 
patient data and chosen for execution under plan B. 
This example illustrates the architectural mechanism underlying our fundamen- 
tal theoretical concept: that an agent dynamically constructs explicit control plans 
to constrain and guide its choices among situation-triggered possible behaviors. 
Guardian always has some number of active control plans, varying in priority. 
Some control plans are quite general and favor the execution of a large class of 
potential operations. Others are more specific and distinguish operations that will 
help Guardian achieve well-defined objectives. Although the example of Fig. 3 
shows only simple one-sentence control plans, the architecture allows (and 
Guardian typically employs) more complex control plans having sequential and 
hierarchical structure. Similarly, Guardian always has some number of possible 
behaviors. Some are triggered by inputs from its perception system, while others 
are triggered by the results of prior reasoning operations. Different operations, if 
executed, could change Guardian’s knowledge of the environment, initiate or 
extend its performance of particular reasoning tasks, initiate performance of 
external actions by its action system. or modify its active control plans. At each 
opportunity, Guardian performs behaviors that best match its highest priority 
active control plans. 
In the following sections, we show how this key architectural mechanism 
enables an agent to adapt its perceptual strategy, control mode, reasoning tasks, 
reasoning methods, and meta-control strategy to its dynamic situation. 
3. Adaptation of perceptual strategy 
In order to perform effectively in AIS niches, an agent must adapt its perceptual 
strategy to changing cognitive requirements. 
In theory, we might like an agent to perceive all events in its environment and 
to reason about them in all promising ways, so that it can determine and carry out 
optimal courses of action. However, AIS niches present high, variable data rates 
for many environmental conditions; a resource-bounded agent cannot realize 
unbounded perception. In addition, AIS niches permit many different reasoning 
tasks and sometimes different methods for performing particular tasks. Each 
perceived event initiates a potential cascade of reasoning activities; the event itself 
triggers a number of possible reasoning operations, each of which produces new 
events, each of which triggers new operations, and so forth. Even if unbounded 
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perception were feasible, the high and cascading demand for reasoning would 
swamp the cognitive resources of an agent such as Guardian (or a human being, 
for that matter). 
In general, a resource-bounded agent ordinarily cannot-and, equally im- 
portant, need not-perceive, reason, or act on every condition in its environment. 
Instead, the agent must be highly selective in its perception of the environment 
and it must adapt its perceptual strategy to balance two objectives. First, from a 
purely quantitative perspective, the agent must maximize its vigilance, perceiving 
as much information as possible about as many environmental conditions as 
possible, while avoiding perceptual overload. Second, from a qualitative perspec- 
tive, the agent must maximize goal-directed effectiveness, readily acquiring data 
that are relevant to its currently important reasoning tasks, while avoiding 
distraction by irrelevant or insignificant data. 
In our architecture, the perception system’s basic functions (Fig. 4) are to 
abstract, prioritize, and filter sensed data before sending it to the cognition 
system. Five parameters determine how the perception system performs these 
functions. Two static compile-time parameters identify the domain variables to be 
sensed and ranges of critical values for those variables. Three dynamic run-time 
parameters (sent asynchronously by the cognition system) specify requested data 
abstractions, relevance values for different variables, and the desired global data 
rate. The perception system processes and sends to the cognition system all 
requested data abstractions at appropriately high rates and sends unrequested 
data at appropriately low (but usually non-zero) rates. It dynamically determines 
the “appropriate” rates at which to send each requested and unrequested 
observation by distributing the current desired global data rate among them in 
Abstmction 
PrioriC,,lion 
Filtering 
Co@lion Focuses Perception: 
I Dynamic Environment 
I J 
Fig. 4. Coordination of cognition and perception. 
proportion to their current relevance values. There is one exception to this rule: 
The perception system sends critical values for all sensed variables, regardless of 
their current relevance values. Note that, since many variables are not sensed 
continuously, this provision does not guarantee perception of every critical value 
that occurs, but only every critical value that is sensed. 
An agent dynamically adapts its perceptual strategy by modifying its three 
run-time parameters based on both feedback control and predictive control from 
the cognitive system. 
The agent adapts its global data rate based on feedback control from activities 
in its cognitive system’s limited-capacity event buffer. The event buffer is 
designed to insure that the cognitive system always retrieves the most important, 
up-to-date perceptions available. Events are ordered in the buffer by priority and 
recency, with best-first retrieval and worst-first overflow. (In theory, the buffer 
mechanism also uses a decay factor to remove unretrieved, out-of-data events, 
but we have not yet implemented a decay factor.) 
The specific function used to integrate priority and recency factors to order 
events in the buffer should be tailored to characteristics of the agent’s niche. For 
example, Guardian’s niche presents events that vary widely in priority, with very 
high priority events occurring infrequently. Important features of its environment 
change relatively slowly and its deadlines are relatively long compared to the 
speed of its perception. Therefore. Guardian orders perceptual events by priority 
and then by recency. It always retrieves the most recent of the most important 
events and, in case of overflow, loses the least recent of the least important 
events. In practice, when critical events occur, Guardian retrieves and reasons 
about them immediately. When multiple critical events co-occur during a brief 
time interval, Guardian handles them promptly in priority order. Most of the 
time, however, no critical events occur and Guardian processes all of the 
incoming events within a few retrieval cycles of their arrival in the buffer-the 
exact order has no effect on the overall utility of its performance. 
Regardless of the specific event-ordering function used, the buffer mechanism is 
designed for steady-state operation in which: (a) perceptual events enter and 
leave the buffer at roughly equal rates; and (b) all of the entering events 
ultimately are retrieved for reasoning. However, steady-state operation assumes 
that the perception system has been parameterized with a global data rate that is 
appropriate for the agent’s reasoning rate. If there is a decrease in the pace of the 
agent’s reasoning or an increase in the rate of critical sensed events, the event 
buffer will overflow-this is the architecture’s “last line of defense” against 
perceptual overload. When the event buffer overflows, it means that the agent’s 
reasoning cannot keep pace with perceptual events and, although it is still 
reasoning about up-to-date events, the agent is losing potentially important 
information. Conversely, when the buffer underflows (i.e., is empty), it means 
that the agent is waiting for perceptual events to reason about and, in the 
meantime, wasting cognitive resources. In either case. the agent corrects the 
imbalance between perception and reasoning rates by modifying the desired 
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global data rate used by the perception system. An earlier version of this 
feedback mechanism implemented a “bang-bang” control response to actual 
over(under)fIow. The current version implements an adaptive control response by 
monitoring trends in the number of items in the buffer and adjusting the global 
data rate in anticipation of over(under)flow occurring. As in conventional control 
applications, the adaptive control gives a smoother correlation between desired 
and actual global data rates. 
The agent also adapts its global data rate predictively. It analyzes newly created 
or modified control plans to estimate its own future demand for cognitive 
resources and, complementarily, its future capacity to process perceptual events. 
Based on this estimate, it may increase or decrease its global data rate. For 
example, when Guardian adopts plan C in Fig. 3, to respond quickly to the 
patient’s low blood pressure, it knows: (a) that the associated reasoning tasks will 
consume computational resources previously consumed by monitoring a variety of 
patient data; and (b) that the new tasks are more important than the monitoring 
task (priority 3 versus 2). It lowers its global data rate. Conversely, it raises its 
global data rate after achieving the goal of plan C. With a little knowledge about 
the computational properties of different reasoning methods, an agent can 
predictively modulate its global data rate more precisely. 
The agent also analyzes control decisions to identify useful data abstractions 
and to determine the context-specific relevance of different variables. For 
example, in plan B of Fig. 3, Guardian’s decision to monitor all patient “data” 
implies that the perception system should send the raw numeric data available 
from its sensors for all patient variables. Alternatively, given appropriate 
definitions for various data abstractions, Guardian might decide to monitor 
“criteria1 changes in value”, “hourly high and low values”, “running averages”, 
etc. Plan B’s initial priority of 3 translates into a mid-range relevance value for all 
patient variables. Guardian’s subsequent reduction of plan B’s priority translates 
into a reduction in relevance. However, Guardian’s simultaneous introduction of 
plan C, to respond to the patient’s low blood pressure with priority 3, preserves 
the medium relevance value for blood pressure. Although we do not illustrate it 
in Fig. 3, Guardian also could identify other variables that are relevant to its 
reasoning under plan C, either based on explicit domain knowledge or in the 
course of the reasoning itself. 
In summary, our architecture enables an agent to adapt its perceptual strategy 
to its cognitive requirements in two ways. First, the agent maximizes its vigilance, 
while avoiding perceptual overload, by using feedback control and predictive 
control (based on control plans) to manage the global data rate underlying its 
perceptual strategy. Second, the agent acquires useful data, while avoiding 
distraction, by using dynamic control plans to adapt the relevance and abstraction 
parameters underlying its perceptual strategy. In an early experiment [50], 
Guardian’s adaptation of its perceptual strategy reduced its input data rates to less 
than 10% of the original sensed data rates, with no degradation in the quality of 
its performance. 
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4. Adaptation of control mode 
In order to function effectively in AIS niches, an agent must adapt its control 
mode to changing features of its control situation. 
We can characterize control situations on several dimensions, including the 
uncertainty of events in the task environment, the degree of constraint on which 
sequences of actions will be effective in achieving goals, and the availability and 
cost of off-line and on-line computational resources. In simple niches, a charac- 
teristic control situation-representing a particular configuration of values on 
these several dimensions-may predominate. In that case, an agent should adopt 
the control mode that is most effective in its predominant situation. For example, 
the most effective control mode for some niches may be to plan and then execute 
carefully coordinated sequences of actions [16,44,50], while in other niches the 
most effective control mode may be to prepare and then execute more localized 
reactions to a range of possible run-time events [1,38,42,45]. 
However, AIS niches do not present characteristic control situations; they 
present control situations that vary over time on several dimensions. Two salient 
dimensions of variability, which we analyze here, are environmental uncertainty 
and constraint on effective actions. Environmental uncertainty determines how 
much monitoring an agent must do to determine run-time conditions. For 
example, a cold post-operative ICU patient presents low uncertainty; the patient 
is probably cold as a natural consequence of the surgery and quite likely to warm 
up gradually to normal body temperature, with no lingering after-effects. By 
contrast, a patient whose blood pressure is falling presents high uncertainty; it is 
unknown how long or how far the blood pressure will fall, what is causing the 
change, and what related effects may occur. Constraint on effective actions 
determines how many alternative courses of action the agent can pursue to 
achieve its goals. For example, there are many ways to help a cold post-operative 
patient regain normal body temperature, but there is only one way to enable a 
patient with a severe pneumothorax (a hole in the lung) to breathe: surgically 
insert a chest tube to allow accumulated air in the chest cavity to escape and 
thereby enable the lungs to inflate. As illustrated in Fig. 5, these two dimensions 
define a space of control situations. 
To function effectively in AIS niches, therefore, an agent must possess and 
exploit a corresponding variety of control modes. 
Like control situations, we can characterize control modes along several 
dimensions. Two salient dimensions, which we analyze here, are: the agent’s 
sensitivity to run-time events and its advance commitment to specific actions. 
Sensitivity to run-time events measures how much the agent monitors its run-time 
environment. Commitment to specific actions measures how much the agent 
restricts in advance the actions it will execute at run time. (Control modes also 
vary, for example, on their demands for off-line and on-line computational and 
real-time resources; however these variables are not included in our analysis.) As 
illustrated in Fig. 5, these two dimensions, sensitivity and commitment, define a 
space of control modes. 
Maximal 
Uncertainty 
of the 
Environment 
Minimal 
t_ 
B. Hayes-Roth i Artificial Intelligence 72 (1995) 329-36.~ 343 
Dimensions of 
Control Modes 
Advance Commitment to Specific Actions 
Minimal Maximal 
Reflex Goal-Specific 
Reaction 
Manage a patient whose 
condition is volatile 
Respond to high PIP 
Wean patieni from 
ventilator 
Apply warm blankets 
to a cold post-opermive 
patient 
,tiake patient presentation 
to physicians on rounds 
Classical 
Dead Reckoning Plan Execution 
Minimal Maximal 
Constraint on Effective Actions 
Maximal t 
Sensitivity to 
Run-Time Events 
Minimal 
Dimensions of 
Control Situations 
Fig. 5. Different control modes for different control situations 
By superimposing the spaces of control modes and control situations in Fig. 5, 
we suggest that particular control modes are appropriate for particular control 
situations-and, more importantly, that an agent could use a similar dimensional 
analysis to identify its dynamic control situation and adapt its control mode as 
appropriate. Let us consider the four corners of the space of control modes. 
In a pure planning mode, an agent commits in advance to a sequence of 
actions, perhaps with limited conditionality, and then executes it at run time with 
minima1 monitoring of run-time events. Planning mode is appropriate for control 
situations with low environmental uncertainty and high constraints on the 
selection and sequencing of effective actions. At the cost of preparation time, the 
agent exploits predictability in its environment to construct and execute an 
effective, efficient plan. For example, when requested to make patient presenta- 
tions for physicians on rounds, Guardian should follow a standard protocol for 
presenting the relevant information in the correct order. 
In a pure reactive mode, the agent commits in advance to a set of specific 
actions and conditions for their execution, but monitors run-time events to control 
invocation of particular actions from the set. Reactive mode is appropriate for 
control situations with high uncertainty and high constraints on effective actions. 
At the cost of preparation time and run-time resources, the agent can exploit its 
monitoring capabilities to respond flexibly to an uncertain environment. For 
example. Guardian should operate in reactive mode when responding to critical 
problems under time pressure, such as reacting to an observed increase in a 
patient’s peak inspiratory pressure (a potentially life-threatening condition) by 
monitoring relevant data closely and using them to choose among a small set of 
predetermined diagnoses and associated therapeutic actions. 
In both planning and reaction modes. an agent commits in advance to specific 
executable actions in order to meet strong constraints imposed by its goals. 
Planning mode exploits predictability of environmental events to minimize 
monitoring while following a single globally coordinated action sequence; thus it 
streamlines run-time performance. Reaction mode copes with greater uncertainty 
of environmental events by preparing a larger number of actions for a larger 
number of contingencies; run-time performance is less streamlined, but more 
robust. In intermediate modes between these two extremes, the agent modulates 
the amount of run-time monitoring and the conditionality of actions. In all regions 
along this border, however, the agent pays a high cost in advance preparation to 
choose the specific conditions it will monitor and the specific actions it will 
perform. The agent is maximally committed and cannot respond to a truly 
unanticipated event or perform a truly unanticipated action. 
In what we might call a pure “dead reckoning” mode, an agent commits to a 
rough sequence of a few classes of actions and executes any sequence of specific 
actions within each successive class at run time. Dead reckoning mode is 
appropriate for control situations with minimal uncertainty of the environment 
and minimal constraints on actions. The agent can produce satisfactory behavior 
with a low cost of advance preparation. For example, Guardian should operate in 
dead reckoning mode when it has weak goals for non-critical conditions and 
plenty of time, such as improving the comfort and condition of cold post- 
operative patients by taking any of several different actions to help them warm up 
during their first couple of hours in the ICU. 
In what we might call a pure “reflex” mode, the agent commits to a large class 
of actions, without specifying any of them individually, and monitors a similarly 
large set of run-time conditions to control its selection of actions for execution. 
Reflex mode is appropriate for control situations with high uncertainty and low 
constraint on effective actions. The agent can maximize its flexibility with a low 
cost of advance preparation. For example, Guardian should operate in reflex 
mode when a patient is very volatile, monitoring a broad class of patient data and 
letting observed irregularities elicit corrective actions. 
In both dead reckoning and reflex modes, an agent is positioned implicitly to 
perform a larger number of specific actions and action sequences, compared to 
planning and reactive modes, respectively. Dead reckoning mode exploits 
predictability in environmental events to predetermine only the general shape of 
behavior, which the agent can instantiate as any of many alternative appropriate 
courses of action at run time. Reflex mode copes with greater environmental 
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uncertainty by relying on run-time monitoring to invoke appropriate actions. In 
the intermediate modes between these two extremes, the agent modulates the 
amount of run-time monitoring and the balance of top-down versus bottom-up 
control of actions. In all modes of this border, however, the agent pays a minimal 
cost of advance preparation by identifying arbitrarily large classes of events to 
monitor and arbitrarily large classes of actions to perform. It does not commit o 
monitor any specific events or to perform any specific actions at all. Thus, unlike 
planning and reaction modes, the agent is always responding to “unanticipated” 
events and performing “unanticipated” actions. 
Our analysis assumes that an agent has adequate monitoring and preparation 
resources for any control mode, but that, other things equal: (a) it prefers to 
spend resources on preparation rather than on monitoring in order to maximize 
the efficiency and global structure of run-time performance; and (b) it prefers to 
spend less resources when that will not compromise its goals. Alternatively, if we 
assume variations in availability or cost of these resources, the superimposed 
spaces show how run-time performance may be degraded in order to conserve 
particular resources. A more comprehensive analysis would introduce availability 
and demand for monitoring and preparation resources as higher-order dimensions 
of the superimposed spaces. The purpose of our analysis in the present context is 
to partially characterize the variability of control situations and differences in the 
situation-specific efficacy of alternative control modes. 
To function effectively in AIS niches, an agent must continually identify its 
control situation, choose an appropriate control mode, and implement the chosen 
mode. We use examples from Guardian’s niche to illustrate how our architecture 
supports this kind of adaptation. 
First, an agent must identify its control situation. The agent can assess the 
uncertainty of its environment by recognizing that it is in states with known 
uncertainty. For example, Guardian might know that certain surgical procedures 
are more likely than others to be followed by recovery problems (higher 
uncertainty) in the ICU. The agent also can assess uncertainty empirically at run 
time, tracking the variance in its observations over time, noticing that planned 
actions are not having their expected effects, etc. The agent can assess the 
constraint on effective actions based on domain knowledge or on measurements 
of the search space associated with a particular goal. For example, Guardian 
might know that physicians want all patient presentations to follow the standard 
protocol (high constraint). As mentioned above, control situations also vary along 
other dimensions, such as the availability of computational and real-time re- 
sources during and prior to run time. As discussed in Section 3, an agent can 
estimate current and future demand for computational resources by analyzing its 
current and future control plans. It can estimate the availability of real-time 
resources on the basis of domain knowledge. For example, Guardian might know 
that some ICU problems evolve slowly, while others quickly become life-threaten- 
ing. 
Next, the agent must choose an appropriate control mode. The superimposed 
spaces in Fig. 5 provide one framework for making this choice. As mentioned 
above, control modes also vary along other dimensions, such as their demand for 
computational and real-time resources during and prior to run time. An agent can 
have qualitative knowledge of the resource requirements associated with generic 
control modes. such as those in Fig. 5. In addition, it might be able to quantify 
the requirements for a particular control mode in a particular parameterized 
situation. 
Having identified its control situation and chosen an appropriate control mode, 
the agent must effect the chosen mode. Fig. 6 summarizes how our architecture 
enables an agent to adapt its control mode, modulating its sensitivity to run-time 
events and its commitment to specific actions by manipulating two properties of 
its control plan: the specificity of action class indicated in each component control 
decision and the degree of sequential organization among control decisions. 
Again we illustrate this capability with the control modes in the four corners of 
the space. 
The agent goes into a pure planning mode by constructing a control plan that 
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comprises a sequence of decisions, each identifying a specific executable action. It 
monitors only those events that are necessary to trigger the current next action in 
the plan. It tries to trigger only each successive next planned action. As a result, 
the agent triggers and executes the planned sequence of specific actions very 
quickly and reliably. 
The agent goes into reactive mode by constructing a control plan that comprises 
an unordered set of decisions, each identifying a specific condition-action 
contingency. It monitors only those events necessary to evaluate the specified 
conditions. It attempts to trigger only the specified actions and executes which- 
ever ones it triggers. As a result, the agent executes a less predictable sequence of 
a reliable set of planned actions. It is a little slower than in planning mode 
because it monitors all conditions all the time. 
The agent goes into dead reckoning mode by constructing a control plan that 
comprises a sequence of a few general action classes. It monitors only those 
events that might trigger any member of the current planned action class. It 
attempts to trigger only actions that are members of the current planned action 
class and executes whichever ones it triggers until the local goal of the current 
planned action class is met. As a result, the agent executes a roughly predictable 
sequence of certain kinds of actions, with variability in the number and specific 
identities of executed actions within each successive class. 
The agent goes into reflex mode by constructing a plan that comprises an 
unordered set of decisions, each identifying a class of condition-action contin- 
gencies. It monitors only those events that might trigger any member of any of the 
action classes and executes whichever ones it triggers. As a result, the agent’s 
behavior is quite unpredictable in the number, identities, and sequence of specific 
actions it executes. 
Our analysis can potentially be translated into the language of classical control 
theory. For example, the border between plans and reactive systems corresponds 
to the control-theoretic distinction between open-loop and closed-loop policies. 
Techniques for choosing optimal control modes also exploit our concept of 
uncertainty. Thus, it is known that in a deterministic environment, an optimal 
open-loop policy exists, while in a stochastic environment there exists a closed- 
loop policy that performs better than any open-loop policy. To our knowledge, 
adaptive control theory does not exploit our concept of constraint on actions 
(which corresponds to the control-theoretic concept of solution density) as a basis 
for prescribing control modes. In addition, although there exist control-theoretic 
approaches to run-time switching of control modes [43], these approaches 
typically switch among a much more homogeneous et of alternative controllers in 
the context of much simpler task environments. Finally, control-theoretic ap- 
proaches do not provide a framework for smooth transitions in a continuous space 
of controllers.’ 
In summary, our architecture enables an agent to adapt its control mode among 
’ I am grateful to Satinder Pal Singh for calling my attention to the relationship between the present 
analysis and the classical control-theoretic analysis. 
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a diverse set of control modes, on the basis of its environmental uncertainty and 
internally determined constraints on its actions, by modifying two key parameters 
of its control plans: specificity and sequential organization of component control 
decisions. 
5. Adaptation of reasoning tasks 
In order to function effectively in AIS niches, an agent must adapt its reasoning 
tasks to dynamic environmental conditions. 
In general, AIS niches demand performance of multiple component reasoning 
tasks. We define a task in terms of the types of domain entities it takes as inputs 
and produces as outputs and the relationships that must hold between particular 
instances of inputs and outputs. For example, in a diagnosis task, inputs are 
observed symptoms in a monitored system, outputs are conditions within the 
system, and the relationship is that the conditions cause the symptoms. For 
example, Guardian might diagnose the physiological condition that is causing a 
patient’s observed low blood pressure. As a second example, in a prediction task, 
inputs are initial conditions in a monitored system, outputs are subsequent 
conditions in the system, and the relationship is that the subsequent conditions 
have a high conditional probability given the initial conditions. For example, 
Guardian might predict the consequences of leaving the patient’s low blood 
pressure untreated. As a third example. in a planning task, inputs are initial 
conditions and desirable subsequent conditions, outputs are specifications for a 
pattern of actions, and the relationship is that performing the planned actions in 
the context of the initial conditions is expected to bring about the desirable 
subsequent conditions. For example, Guardian might plan therapeutic actions to 
raise the patient’s low blood pressure back to normal range. An agent such as 
Guardian has many opportunities to perform different instances of each of these 
tasks and to perform sequences of related tasks, for example perceiving a 
problem, diagnosing it, then planning and executing a corrective response. 
Our agent architecture provides a natural platform for realizing and integrating 
performance of diverse, potentially interacting tasks. As discussed in Section 2, 
each of an agent’s reasoning methods is operationalized as a set of event-triggered 
reasoning operations, including some that construct control plans to organize the 
reasoning process appropriately in particular situations. Execution of each 
reasoning operation contributes to an incrementally growing solution in global 
memory and produces events that may trigger other reasoning operations. This 
“blackboard model” for reasoning is extremely general; it can support the 
inferential processes underlying many different reasoning tasks and potential 
interactions among tasks based on intermediate, as well as final results [12,29]. 
Within the architecture, any perceptual or cognitive event potentially can 
trigger operations involved in any known task. All triggered operations are placed 
on a global agenda, where they compete to be scheduled and executed. 
Depending on its control plan, the agent may execute all the operations in a given 
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reasoning task prior to beginning a new one or it may interleave the operations of 
several tasks. In either case, the intermediate and final results of different tasks 
are recorded in the global memory, where they can influence one another. In 
Section 2 above, we illustrated how Guardian initiates, performs, and terminates 
a single task in response to a perceptual event: it reactively diagnosed and 
corrected a problem signaled by perceived low blood pressure. More generally, 
the event-based triggering of task-specific operations allows an agent to adapt its 
selection and sequencing of reasoning tasks to perceived conditions in the external 
environment and to internally generated conditions reflecting the intrinsic 
relations among reasoning tasks. 
Table 3 illustrates Guardian’s performance of a series of interacting perception, 
reasoning, and action tasks in which each task is triggered by preceding 
Table 3 
Illustrative chain of reasoning tasks initiated by cognitive and perceptual events 
Triggering events Tasks performed Resulting events 
1. Sense: Patient data Perceive: Patient data 
2. Perceive: PIP value 
3. Observe: PIP high, rising tl-t3 
Assess: PIP values Observe: PIP high, rising rl-t3 
Diagnose: PIP rising 
4. Expect: Low arterial 0, Plan: Improve arterial 0, now 
5. Intend: Raise FIO, now 
6. Hypothesize: Compliance 
Do: Raise FIO, 
Perceive: FIO, setting 
Diagnose: Compliance 
7. Expect: Falling arterial 0, Plan: Lower PIP now and 
Expect: Possible death > t8 Normalize arterial 0, 
8. Intend: Insert chest tube now Do: Insert chest tube Observe: Chest tube inserted 
Perceive: Chest tube insertion Observe: Lower PIP now 
Perceive: PIP data Expect: Raise arterial 0, 
9. 
10. 
Observe: Lower PIP Plan: Normalize arterial 0, 
Intend: Lower FIO, now Do: Lower FIO, Observe: Lower FIO, 
Perceive: FIOz setting Expect: Normal arterial 0, 
Observe: Many data values 
Intend: Normal patient state 
Expect: Normal patient data 
Hypothesize: Compliance 
Expect: Low arterial 0, 
Intend: Raise FIO, now 
Conditionally Expect: 
Raise arterial 0, gradually 
Observe: Raise FIO, 
Expect: Raise arterial 0, grad. 
Hypothesize: Pneumothorax tl 
Expect: Falling arterial 0, 
Expect: Possible death > r8 
(a) Step 1 
Intend: Insert chest tube now 
Conditionally Expect: 
Lower PIP now 
Conditionally Expect: 
Raise arterial 0, promptly 
(b) Step 2 
Intend: Lower FIO, now 
Conditionally Expect: 
Normal arterial 0, 
perceptual or cognitive events and produces cognitive events of its own that may 
trigger subsequent tasks. Table 3 does not show the triggering, execution, and 
results of each task’s component reasoning operations. And it does not show the 
many triggered tasks that Guardian does not choose to execute. 
In step 1, Guardian is observing a variety of patient data. It intends that the 
patient it is monitoring should be in a “normal” state (normal for a particular 
class of post-surgical patients) and. because it is not aware of any problems, 
expects that all patient data will be normal. As we shall see, much of Guardian’s 
reasoning is driven by discrepancies between phenomena it observes, expects and 
intends. Our agent architecture makes these distinctions explicit and automatically 
detects mismatches to trigger reasoning activities. 
In steps 2-3, Guardian detects an oxygen delivery problem and partially 
diagnoses it. In step 1. Guardian perceives patient data available from its sensors 
and produces a number of observations. In step 2, one of the new observations, 
the new value of PIP (peak inspiratory pressure), triggers a task to assess the 
dynamic state of the patient’s PIP. The assessment task produces a new 
observation, that the patient’s PIP is high and has been rising during the time 
interval tl-r3. This observation violates Guardian’s expectation of normal patient 
data and so, in step 3, triggers a task to diagnose the cause of the discrepancy. 
The diagnosis task itself produces two results: a hypothesis that the patient is 
suffering from a compliance problem (inability to inhale sufficient air; as opposed 
to a sensor error in PIP measurement or a mechanical problem in the ventilator, 
for example); and an expectation that, as a result, the patient’s arterial oxygen 
will be low. 
At this point, the diagnosis is not complete: Guardian does not know what is 
causing the compliance problem. However, because the expected low arterial 
oxygen violates Guardian’s intention that the patient should be in a normal state 
and because arterial oxygen is a life-critical physiological parameter, it does not 
immediately continue the diagnosis task. Instead, in step 4, the xpectation of low 
arterial oxygen triggers a planning task to improve the patient’s arterial oxygen 
now. The planning task produces an intention to raise the FIOz now (increasing 
the fraction of inhaled oxygen delivered by the ventilator). with the conditional 
expectation that doing so will raise the patient’s arterial oxygen gradually. In step 
5. the intention to raise FIO, now triggers the corresponding action and an 
associated perceptual task to confirm successful execution of the action. Guardian 
observes that it has indeed raised the patient’s FIO, and, as a result, expects the 
arterial oxygen to rise. Note that. in the present scenario (without an oximeter in 
place), Guardian cannot observe the arterial oxygen directly and so must rely on 
the expected effects of its action of raising the FIO?. 
In step 6, Guardian continues its diagnosis of the oxygen delivery (compliance) 
problem. The previous hypothesis of a compliance problem (produced in step 3). 
which violates Guardian’s intention of normal patient state, triggers a task to 
diagnose the underlying cause. This task produces three results: a more specific 
hypothesis, that the patient suffered a pneumothorax (a hole in the lung that 
allows inhaled air to rush out into the chest cavity, compressing the lungs and 
preventing subsequent inhalation) at time tl; an expectation that, as a result of 
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the pneumothorax and despite Guardian’s having raised the FIO,, the patient’s 
arterial oxygen will continue to fall; and a second expectation that, as a result of 
the falling arterial oxygen, the patient may die after time t8. 
In step 7, these two expectations, which dramatically violate Guardian’s 
intention of normal patient state, trigger a two-part planning task: (a) to lower the 
patient’s PIP now so that any oxygen at all can be delivered; and (b) to normalize 
the patient’s arterial oxygen. The first part of the planning task produces step 1: 
an intention to insert a chest tube immediately (to relieve pressure in the chest 
cavity and enable the lungs to inflate), with the conditional expectation that doing 
so will lower the patient’s PIP immediately and, as a result, raise the arterial 
oxygen promptly. 
At this point, the plan is not complete: Guardian has not determined how to 
normalize the patient’s arterial oxygen. However, because the patient is in a 
life-threatening condition, it does not immediately continue its planning task. 
Instead, in step 8, the intention to insert a chest tube now triggers the 
corresponding action and associated perceptual tasks to confirm the insertion of 
the chest tube and the expected lowering of the patient’s PIP. Again, Guardian 
cannot observe the expected rise in arterial oxygen directly and must rely on the 
expected effects of lowering the patient’s PIP in the presence of a pneumothorax. 
In step 9, Guardian’s confirmation of the expected lower PIP triggers resump- 
tion of its interrupted planning task, producing step 2: an intention to lower the 
FIO, (back to its previous level), with the conditional expectation that arterial 
oxygen will gradually return to normal. In step 10, this intention triggers the 
corresponding action and an associated perceptual task to confirm the new FIO, 
setting. Again, Guardian expects, but cannot observe directly, that the patient’s 
arterial oxygen gradually will return to normal. At this point in the scenario, with 
the crisis apparently resolved and the time pressure eased, Guardian may decide 
to place an oximeter so that it can monitor the patient’s arterial oxygen directly 
or, alternatively, to send a blood sample to the laboratory for a gas analysis after 
twenty minutes or so. 
As this scenario illustrates, our architecture allows an agent to perform a 
variety of reasoning tasks and, more importantly, to adapt its selection, ordering, 
and interleaving of reasoning tasks to dynamic perceived and inferred conditions 
in its environment. Triggering tasks with perceptual events enables the agent to 
adapt to exogenously produced changes in the world. Triggering tasks with 
cognitive events enables the agent to follow the intrinsic logical relations among 
tasks-where the intermediate or final results of one task provide the input to 
another. Explicit representation of the initial, intermediate, and final results of 
reasoning tasks allows the agent to interrupt and resume tasks deliberately. 
6. Adaptation of reasoning methods 
In order to function effectively in AIS niches, an agent must adapt its reasoning 
methods to the available information. 
Given our input-output definition of tasks, there may be alternative methods 
for performing particular tasks. For example, an agent might perform a diagnosis 
task by means of a “model-based” method, in which it instantiates structure/ 
function models of phenomena observed in the monitored system and follows 
causal links to identify and instantiate hypothesized precursors. Alternatively, an 
agent might apply a “structured selection” method [lo], in which it abstracts the 
observed data, performs a heuristic mapping into the hypothesis space, and 
refines the identified hypothesis back into the problem context. Alternatively, the 
agent might use a case-based method [49], in which it retrieves cases manifesting 
problems similar to the observed problem and hypothesizes that the diagnoses 
associated with those cases may explain the observed problem. Similarly, 
alternative methods may be applicable to other tasks, such as monitoring, 
prediction, and planning. 
Following our analysis of situation-appropriate control modes (Section 4), we 
offer a similar analysis of situation-appropriate reasoning methods. Again, 
reasoning situations and methods vary along complementary dimensions: availa- 
bility versus consumption of resources (e.g., domain knowledge, environmental 
data, real time, and computation); demand versus provision of performance 
properties (e.g., interruptability, potentially useful intermediate results); and 
requirement versus provision of response features (e.g., precision, certainty, 
quality, and justification). 
Taking a subset of the dimensions defined by these variables for illustration, 
Fig. 7 superimposes two two-dimensional spaces, mapping methods that vary in 
their consumption of domain knowledge and run-time data onto situations that 
vary in the availability of these two resources. Methods in particular regions of 
the superimposed spaces are “appropriate” for situations in corresponding 
regions, based on two simplifying assumptions: (a) as more knowledge and data 
are brought to bear, the agent’s response improves monotonically on all features; 
and (b) the agent prefers to expend whatever resources are available in order to 
produce the highest quality response. A more complete analysis would incorpo- 
rate information about the actual cost of resources and the utility of particular 
performance and response features as higher-order dimensions of the superim- 
posed spaces. But even with our simplifying assumptions, the present analysis 
illustrates the need and potential for agents operating in AIS niches to choose and 
use appropriate reasoning methods in different reasoning situations. 
For illustration, we consider methods representing the four corners of the space 
in Fig. 7, applied to a prediction task. 
Applying a quantitative simulation method [28] to a prediction task, an agent 
uses observed numeric data to instantiate parameters representing the initial 
conditions and other important variables in a set of differential equations and 
calculates the predicted values of the variables of interest after variable time t. 
Quantitative simulation produces precise, reliable, temporally specific quantita- 
tive results and explanatory justification in terms of the instantiated equations. 
Computation time may be high. Other things equal, quantitative simulation is 
appropriate when the reasoning context includes an appropriate set of differential 
equations and the run-time data necessary to instantiate the necessary parame- 
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Fig. 7. Different methods for different contexts. 
ters. For example, Guardian should use quantitative simulation to predict 
whether current values of FIO, (amount of oxygen provided by the ventilator on 
each breath) will maintain normal blood gases for the patient over some time 
period. 
Applying a causal modeling method [40] to a prediction task, an agent uses 
qualitative observations to instantiate variables in a causal network with the initial 
conditions and follows causal links to identify predicted conditions. Causal 
modeling produces reliable, qualitative results, but no specific temporal in- 
formation. It provides explanatory justification in terms of the instantiated 
conditions and causal links in the model. Run-time computation depends on the 
branching factor and depth of the model. Other things equal, causal modeling is 
appropriate when the reasoning context includes an appropriate causal model and 
when either: (a) the data, knowledge, or resources necessary to instantiate a more 
precise quantitative model are not available; or (b) the precision of quantitative 
simulation is not needed. For example, Guardian should use causal modeling to 
predict that aspirin given to a post-operative patient for pain will also thin the 
patient’s blood (a side-effect) and, therefore, might also cause internal bleeding. 
With both quantitative simulation and causal modeling, an agent exploits strong 
models to make predictions (or perform other tasks) and to explain its conclu- 
sions. Quantitative simulation also exploits larger amounts of run-time data to 
produce more specific. temporally constrained, quantitative predictions. Causal 
modeling compensates for a lack of relevant run-time data by producing more 
general, qualitative predictions with less specific temporal properties. Applying 
intermediate methods between quantitative simulation and causal modeling, the 
agent uses whatever data are available to quantify its model-based predictions as 
much as possible. With all methods along this border, however, the agent pays a 
high cost in run-time computation to reason out its predictions (or other 
conclusions). In addition. the agent’s ability to perform its task with these 
methods is limited by the availability of appropriate models-which tend to be in 
short supply in some domains, such as ICU monitoring, but more available in 
other domains such as device monitoring. 
Applying a pattern extrapolation method [46] to a prediction task, an agent 
incrementally instantiates time-varying patterns in observed data values and 
extraplates their completion to identify predicted conditions. Pattern extrapola- 
tion can produce predictions where no models are available, but with high 
uncertainty and no explanatory justification at all. Run-time computation depends 
on the number and complexity of known pattern definitions. Pattern extrapolation 
is appropriate when the reasoning context provides a lot of run-time data for 
developing and distinguishing among different potential patterns. For example, 
Guardian could use pattern extrapolation to predict that a monitored patient’s 
rising temperature might continue to rise at its current rate, eventually reaching a 
dangerous region. 
Applying a case-based method [19,31,41] to a prediction task. an agent 
retrieves a previous case in which conditions similar to those in the present case 
occurred and predicts that subsequent conditions in the present case will be 
similar to those in the previous case. Case-based reasoning can produce predic- 
tions in a broad range of situations, but with high uncertainty and no explanatory 
justification at all. Computation time depends on the agent’s repertoire of cases 
and indexing mechanism. Case-based reasoning is appropriate when the task 
context includes a representative sample of cases and the run-time data necessary 
to index into the “right” prior case. For example, Guardian could use case-based 
reasoning about previous lung surgery patients to predict that a post-operative 
patient who is performing his breathing exercises very vigorously might develop a 
pneumothorax (a hole in the lung) in the area of a lung incision. 
With both pattern extrapolation and case-based reasoning, an agent compen- 
sates for the absence of good models by using other kinds of knowledge (abstract 
pattern definitions or previous cases) to make predictions (or perform other 
reasoning tasks). Pattern extrapolation also exploits the availability of large 
amounts of run-time data to compensate for the absence of relevant cases. With 
all methods along this border, the agent pays a minimal cost in run-time 
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computation. Its ability to perform its task is limited primarily by its repertoire of 
abstract pattern definitions and prior cases, which are readily available in medical 
domains such as ICU monitoring (often called “clinical experience”), as well as in 
engineering domains. 
Our architecture provides a natural environment for representing, selecting, 
and applying situation-appropriate reasoning methods. Alternative methods for 
performing a given task can be represented as different collections of reasoning 
operations, all of which might be triggered by events signaling a need for that task 
to be performed. For example, Guardian’s decision to give a patient aspirin to 
relieve pain might trigger a control decision to predict possible side effects, along 
with the initial reasoning operations underlying quantitative simulation, causal 
modeling, and case-based reasoning methods for performing prediction tasks. At 
that point, Guardian is free to apply any, all, or none of the triggered methods. 
Because reasoning skills are represented explicitly, an agent can determine what 
run-time data and models are required by a given method in a situation, and 
which of the required data and models are available in the situation. Continuing 
the example, Guardian could follow the analysis of Fig. 7 (or a similar analysis 
that incorporates other situational variables) to determine that, for the effects of 
aspirin, it has a very large number of potentially relevant cases varying on many 
dimensions, no quantitative models at all, and a simple causal model with a 
modest demand for run-time data. Under these circumstances, it would be 
appropriate to use the causal model. By modifying its initial control decision, so 
that it now intends to causally predict the side effects of giving aspirin, Guardian 
insures the selection of causal reasoning operations to perform its task. 
In summary, our architecture allows an agent to adapt its reasoning methods to 
the availability of resources by representing a diverse collection of reasoning 
methods as sets of event-triggered reasoning operations, explicitly storing meth- 
od-specific resource requirements, and allowing the agent to construct run-time 
control plans that reflect its assessment of situation-specific resource availability. 
7. Adaptation of meta-control strategy 
In order to function effectively in AIS niches, an agent must adapt its meta- 
control strategy to dynamic configurations of demands and opportunities for 
activity. 
An agent’s meta-control strategy places global constraints on its allocation of 
computational and physical (e.g., sensors, effecters) resources among competing 
activities. As a result, it determines which goals the agent achieves, to what 
degree, and with what side effects. As illustrated throughout this paper, our 
architecture permits an agent to adapt its perceptual strategy, control mode, 
reasoning task, and reasoning method to the requirements of a given activity. 
However, AIS niches characteristically present demands and opportunities for 
multiple activities during overlapping time intervals. For example, an ICU patient 
may manifest several simultaneous problems, varying in criticality. While Guar- 
dian is responding to one set of problems, it must continue to monitor other 
aspects of the patient’s condition and, quite possibly, respond to newly occurring 
problems along the way. In addition, Guardian may perform other tasks not 
directly concerned with patient monitoring. such as describing a patient’s progress 
during the preceding eight hours to a physician on rounds, explaining its 
diagnostic reasoning to a medical student, or advising a nurse of anticipated 
changes in the patient’s condition. How should Guardian respond to each new 
demand or opportunity as it arises? How should its responses to new events 
impact on its prior commitments to ongoing activities-and vice versa? Thus, in 
AIS niches, the meta-control problem is: How should an agent allocate its limited 
computational resources among dynamic configurations of competing and com- 
plementary activities so as to achieve a high overall utility of its behavior? 
Our architecture provides a natural framework for dynamic adaptation of 
explicit meta-control strategies for global coordination of behavior. Working 
within the basic architectural mechanism, an agent can trigger meta-control 
operations based on changes to its control plans. It can use some meta-control 
operations to monitor its activity-specific control decisions, their implications for 
resource consumption, and its actual progress toward associated objectives-all as 
they evolve over time. It can use other operations to revise activity-specific 
control decisions in light of global considerations. For example. Guardian might 
notice that it has made a series of control decisions to diagnose and treat a series 
of unanticipated problems. Although each of these decisions may be individually 
justifiable, together they may exhaust Guardian’s computational and perceptual 
resources and, as a result, compromise its vigilance. Even worse, the division of 
available resources among the several problems may preclude treating any of 
them before its deadline. Having made this assessment, Guardian could make a 
meta-control decision to postpone its diagnosis and treatment of the least 
important of its pending problems to conserve resources for monitoring and to 
insure treatment of the most critical problems by deadline. 
The architecture also allows an agent to use meta-control decisions prospective- 
ly to establish the desired global character of its intended behavior by constraining 
subsequent meta-level and activity-specific control reasoning. For example, in the 
episodes illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9, Guardian is monitoring a patient who 
develops two problems, first low blood pressure and then high PIP (peak 
inspiratory pressure). In both cases, Guardian diagnoses the low blood pressure 
as resulting from dehydration and treats it by increasing fluid intake. In both 
cases, it diagnoses the high PIP first as a hypoxia problem, which it treats by 
increasing the patient’s oxygen, and then more specifically as the result of a 
pneumothorax, which it treats by inserting a chest tube. However, in the two 
figures these problems and treatments occur in different meta-level contexts, 
producing subtle, but significant differences in Guardian’s behavior and, under 
some value models, in the overall utility of its behavior. 
The two episodes differ in meta-control decision B versus B’. In Fig. 8, 
Guardian has made meta-control decision B, to give its highest priority to urgent 
problems, its next highest priority to monitoring, and its third highest priority to 
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B. Priority Ordering: Urgent problems, Monitoring, Other problems 
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Fig. 8. Illustrative behavioral effects of meta-control strategy B. 
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Fig. 9. Illustrative behavioral effects of meta-control strategy B’. 
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other problems. As a result, when it observes and decides to respond quickly to 
the patient’s high PIP, Guardian maintains its current monitoring activity, but 
decides to suspend its activities related to the patient’s low blood pressure, a less 
important problem, until it has resolved the patient’s high PIP. In Fig. 9, 
Guardian has made a different meta-control decision B’, to respond to perceived 
problems immediately. As a result, when it observes and decides to respond 
quickly to the patient’s high PIP, Guardian continues its activities related to the 
patient’s low blood pressure, but reduces its monitoring activities until it has 
resolved the patient’s high PIP. A comparison of corresponding elements of Figs. 
8 and 9 reveals other consequences of the difference in meta-level strategy. Under 
strategy B in Fig. 8, Guardian completes its diagnosis and treatment of the high 
PIP faster than under strategy B’ in Fig. 9, but completes its diagnosis and 
treatment of the low blood pressure problem later. Under strategy B in Fig. 8, it 
remains sensitive to patient data not directly related to its current activities (e.g., 
heart rate), while under strategy B’ in Fig. 9, its attention to patient data is 
depressed by its attention to immediate problems. Depending on Guardian’s 
value model, each of these meta-control strategies could produce a higher overall 
utility of behavior. 
As these simple examples illustrate, our architecture uses the same underlying 
mechanism to enable an agent to represent, reason about, and use both activity- 
specific control plans and meta-control plans. An agent can adapt its meta-control 
strategy to its dynamic configuration of potential activities by: (a) analyzing 
control plans representing intended activities to estimate their resource require- 
ments; (b) assessing the availability of required resources in the prospective 
situation; and (c) making or modifying meta-control decisions that establish 
appropriate constraints on the construction of activity-specific ontrol plans. From 
the agent’s point of view, meta-control plans are no different from other control 
plans, all of which simply establish local preferences for performing different 
classes of reasoning operations-which may include different classes of task-level 
reasoning operations, control operations, and meta-control operations. Similarly, 
the agent need not treat meta-control planning any differently from its other 
reasoning activities, all of which occur through the scheduling and execution of 
event-triggered reasoning operations. 
8. Evaluation 
8.1. Evaluation paradigm 
How can we evaluate the proposed architecture for adaptive intelligent 
systems? 
Given the complexity of the behavior we aim to support, we emphasize 
empirical evaluation. Following Simon’s observations on computer systems in 
general, we believe that the problems we are trying to address more closely 
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resemble those of biology or psychology than physics and therefore so should our 
methods: 
We are never going to have three laws of motion in computer science. 
. . . Now computing systems may or may not be as complicated as living 
organisms, but they are pretty complicated, and the principal way in which 
we are going to learn about them is to go into a laboratory and find facts. We 
do that by building systems and testing them. [47, p. 1281 
Moreover, we believe that challenging real-world domains (rather than artifi- 
cially structured games or toy problems) offer the richest experimental testbed for 
investigating adaptive intelligent systems, their architectures, and their behavior. 
In fact, it is difficult to define an artificial task domain that can simulate all of the 
dimensions of adaptation we observe in real-world AIS niches. Thus, for 
example, Feigenbaum explains how working on the DENDRAL project [15] 
played a critical role in the discovery that production rules could be used for 
knowledge representation: 
Buchanan succeeded where Waterman failed because Buchanan was im- 
mersed in the details of the chemistry, the knowledge representation 
problem, and the programming of the reasoning process. Waterman was only 
an onlooker. The immense importance of the experimental method in AI, 
and more broadly in CS, is that it provides the necessary mental data in 
sufficient detail to stimulate innovation and discovery. Perhaps it’s easier to 
discover new ideas than to invent them! (14, p. 1971 
Our goal is to develop an architecture that meets a suficiency criterion, 
supporting adaptive intelligent systems throughout a large class of AIS niches. 
Thus, it is less important that any particular aspect of the architecture should 
embody the optimal approach to achieving any particular form of adaptation than 
that the architecture should gracefully integrate all of the required forms of 
adaptation-and that it should demonstrably be able to produce those behavioral 
adaptations as required by the operating environment. As Newell remarks on how 
best to evaluate unified theories of cognition: 
Necessary characteristics are well and good, but they are substantially less 
than half the story. Suficiency is all important. [37, p. 1581 
Finally, other things being equal-in particular, given that the sufficiency 
criterion has been met, we prefer architectural parsimony. A compelling architec- 
ture should minimize the number of component mechanisms with which it 
supports the several required forms of adaptation. 
8.2. Current status of experimental agents 
Our architecture has been implemented in an application-independent form and 
used to build experimental agents in several of the AIS niches in Fig. 1. 
Guardian is the most substantial of our experimental agents. Guardian 
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demonstration 4 (251 monitors on the order of twenty continuously sensed patient 
data variables and several occasionally sensed variables. Its tasks include moni- 
toring, fault detection, diagnosis, prediction, explanation, and planning. It has 
relatively fast reasoning methods based on clinical knowledge of commonly 
occurring problems, their typical symptoms, and their standard treatments. It also 
has relatively slow, but more comprehensive reasoning methods based on 
symbolic knowledge of the underlying anatomy, physiology, and pathophysiology. 
Guardian demonstration 4 has been applied to a small number of simple, but 
realistic ICU scenarios. As illustrated in examples throughout the paper, this 
version of Guardian performs rudimentary versions of all of the different kinds of 
adaptation discussed above. Guardian demonstration 5, which is currently under 
development, will monitor on the order of 100 variables. It will perform the same 
set of tasks performed in demonstration 4, but with a more comprehensive set of 
methods. It will have a much larger medical knowledge base. Most important in 
the present context, Guardian demonstration 5 will provide a richer environment 
for evaluating the claimed architectural support for adaptation. 
In addition to Guardian, several experimental monitoring agents have been 
developed in the architecture. In our laboratory, we have developed experimental 
agents to monitor power plant equipment [49] and semi-conductor manufacturing 
equipment [35]. Both of these agents possess symbolic representations of the 
structure, function, and behavior of the equipment being monitored. They 
perform model-based process tracking, diagnosis, prediction, and explanation. 
Each one has been demonstrated on two or three simple, but realistic scenarios. 
A similar agent has been developed to monitor materials processing [39]. These 
applications demonstrate the generality of our agent architecture across diverse 
domains within the AIS monitoring niche. 
More recently, we have begun studying the application of our architecture to a 
class of niches for adaptive intelligent robots, which we call “AIbots”. In a first 
demonstration (241, we developed a simulated robot that plans surveillance 
destinations and routes, gathers information from the environment, and responds 
to unanticipated alarms. Despite its simplicity, this agent exhibits several of the 
kinds of adaptation discussed in this paper. It uses reasoning to select and 
parameterize perceptual strategies and navigation strategies. It uses dynamic 
control plans to decide which high-level task to perform (e.g., situation assess- 
ment, planning. information gathering) and which method to use for a given task 
(e.g., a classical planner versus a case-based planner). In a second demonstration, 
we developed a simulated robot that acts as a general office factotum. It can 
deliver messages personally or electronically, fetch and deliver objects, and learn 
unanticipated features of its environment. It accepts asynchronous requests for 
instances of these message and object goals and generates learning goals for itself. 
It plans and executes behavior to achieve goals in various sequences and 
combinations, based on their priorities. deadlines, and interactions with one 
another. This agent continuously adapts whatever pending goals and plans it has 
in light of newly perceived information about its environment, new goals, or the 
tenanticipated details of progress on current goals and plans. Finally, in a third 
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demonstration, we have demonstrated the above-described behaviors on an actual 
Nomad 200 robot [52] operating in our offices. 
The intelligent monitoring niches exemplified by Guardian and the intelligent 
robotics niches exemplified in our AIbots demand the array of behavioral 
adaptations characteristic of all adaptive intelligent systems, but they emphasize 
complementary subsets of these demands. The Guardian niche emphasizes broad 
and deep domain knowledge and reasoning, important requirements for adaptive 
selective perception (but no real signal processing), and minimal requirements for 
action control. The AIbots niche emphasizes signal interpretation as well as 
selective perception, important requirements for controlling physical action, and 
simpler cognitive behaviors. For this reason, we find them to be an interesting 
combination of niches in which to evaluate our architecture. 
8.3. Comparison with other architectures 
Although our architecture is not the only one that supports adaptation, it is one 
of a small set of candidate architectures currently in the literature. However, most 
of these other architectures focus on selected aspects of adaptation, as illustrated 
by the following examples. Soar [32,37] provides a very general search mechanism 
that can be applied to a variety of reasoning tasks and a learning mechanism that 
automatically moves the agent from search to a more reactive control mode based 
on experience. However, it does not provide a mechanism for perceptual 
adaptation or a mechanism for deliberately choosing reasoning tasks, reasoning 
methods, or control modes. The subsumption architecture [8] embodies a layered 
control model in which each layer adapts its behavior continuously to relevant 
perceptual information and imposes constraints on the responsiveness of the layer 
below itself. However, it has been applied primarily to the perceptual-motor 
behavior of mobile robots. It has not yet been extended to support reasoning and 
it does not provide a mechanism that allows an agent to dynamically choose 
among its own capabilities. CIRCA [36] and a similar architecture based on the 
Maruti real-time operating system [27] offer a two-layer architecture in which 
unpredictable AI methods are used to set goals and priorities for a real-time 
scheduler that guarantees to meet hard deadlines (assuming that is feasible) and 
to use slack resources effectively. This architecture adapts its real-time schedule 
to available resources and current priorities, but it does not provide other forms 
of adaptation, particularly within its use of the AI methods. 
A caveat: We do not mean to suggest that these architectures are not capable of 
providing all of the required forms of adaptation, but only that their ability to do 
so has not yet been demonstrated and is not immediately obvious to us. 
8.4. Other related work 
Several researchers are working on particular forms of adaptation independent 
of architectural context. Notable examples are: anytime algorithms that trade 
reasoning time for solution quality [7], design-to-time scheduling algorithms for 
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maximizing the use of available resources while meeting deadlines on critical tasks 
[ 171, reactive systems that provide bounded response times for specified events 
[42] or flexible adaptation to unanticipated event orderings (1,381, approximate 
processing techniques that provide acceptably degraded responses when resources 
are short [ll]. We view these approaches as useful capabilities that we would 
strive to integrate within our architecture. 
9. Conclusions 
We have characterized a class of AIS niches. They require performance of 
diverse competing, and complementary tasks. They provide variable, possibly 
inadequate, resources for performing tasks. They present variably stressful 
contextual conditions. They impose conflicting performance criteria, which often 
cannot be satisfied completely. Therefore we have argued that, to function 
effectively in AIS niches, an agent must be highly adaptive. It must adapt its 
perceptual strategy to its dynamic cognitive requirements. It must adapt its 
control mode to uncertainty in its environment and constraints on its actions. It 
must adapt its reasoning tasks to demands and opportunities presented by its 
environment. It must adapt its reasoning methods to the available resources. It 
must adapt its meta-control strategy to its dynamic configuration of potential 
activities. 
We find AIS niches motivating for three reasons. First, AIS niches represent a 
substantial increment in behavioral requirements compared to niches occupied by 
typical AI agents. They stress our science. They force us to deal with uncertainty 
and resource limitations. They force us to balance traditional efforts to design 
optimal solutions to isolated problems with efforts to design integrated solutions 
to complex problems. Second, AIS niches appear to represent an achievable 
objective. They do not overwhelm us with the complexity of all of human 
behavior, but focus our investigation on a powerful and pervasive property of 
human behavior: adaptation. Third, AIS niches represent significant real applica- 
tions (e.g., intelligent monitoring systems, intelligent surveillance systems, intel- 
ligent associate systems). Agents that function effectively in these niches would 
have real practical and social utility. 
In this paper, we argue on behalf of a particular agent architecture for AIS 
niches. However, as noted above, there are other sophisticated agent architec- 
tures that could be candidates for AIS niches. The success criteria for an AIS 
architecture are sufficiency, not necessity, followed by parsimony. It is quite 
possible that further evaluation of these candidates will identify several sufficient 
architectures. In the meantime, we have had a modest success in using our own 
architecture to build experimental agents in several AIS niches and in demonstrat- 
ing the required kinds of adaptation. Moreover, we have been able to support the 
several required dimensions of adaptation parsimoniously, by means of a single 
architectural concept: An agent dynamically constructs explicit control plans to 
guide its choices among situation-triggered possible actions. 
B. Hayes-Roth I Artificial Intelligence 72 (1995) 329-365 363 
Acknowledgement 
This research was supported by NASA contract NAG 2-581 under ARPA 
Order 6822, subcontract No. 71715-l from Teknowledge Federal Systems under 
ARPA contract No. DAAA21-92-C-0028, and AFOSR grant AFOSR-91-0131. 
We thank Edward A. Feigenbaum for sponsoring the work in the Knowledge 
Systems Laboratory. We thank two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful 
criticisms and suggestions for improving earlier versions of the paper. Many 
individuals have contributed to different features of the AIS architecture and the 
Guardian system discussed in this paper: D. Ash, L.J. Barr, L. Boureau, L. 
Brownston, A. Collinot, V. Dabija, J. Drakopoulos, D. Gaba, G. Gold, M. 
Hewett, R. Hewett, A. Macalalad, A. Seiver, S. Uckun, A. Vina, R. Washington. 
References 
[l] P.E. Agre and D. Chapman, Pen@: an implementation of a theory of activity, in: Proceedings 
AAAI-87, Seattle, WA (1987). 
[2] J.S. Albus, Outline for a theory of intelligence, IEEE Trans. Cyst. Man Cybern. 21 (1991) 
473-509. 
[3] J.S. Albus. Brains, Behavior, and Robotics (BYTE Books, Peterborough, NH, 1981). 
[4] J.S. Albus, System description and design architecture for multiple autonomous undersea 
vehicles, National Institute of Standards and Technology Report 1251, Gaithersburg, MD (1988). 
[5] D. Ash, G. Gold, A. Seiver and B. Hayes-Roth, Guaranteeing real-time response with limited 
resources, 1. Artif. Intell. Med. 5 (1) (1993) 49-66. 
[6] D. Ash and B. Hayes-Roth, A comparison of action-based hierarchies and decision trees for 
real-time performance, in: Proceedings AAAI-93, Washington, DC (1993). 
[7] M. Boddy and T. Dean, Solving time-dependent planning problems, in: Proceedings IJCAI-89, 
Detroit, MI (1989). 
[S] R.A. Brooks, A robust layered control system for a mobile robot, IEEE J. Rob. Autom. 2 (1) 
(1986) 14-23. 
[9] R.A. Brooks, Intelligence without reason, in: Proceedings IJCAI-Yf, Sydney, Australia (1991) 
569-595. 
[lO] W.J. Clancey, Heuristic classification, Arfif. Infell. 27 (1985) 289-350. 
(111 K. Decker, V. Lesser and R. Whitehair, Extending a blackboard architecture for approximate 
processing, J. Real-Time Syst. 2 (1990) 47-70. 
[12] R. Engelmore and T. Morgan, eds.. Blackboard Systems (Addison-Wesley, Menlo Park. CA. 
1988). 
1131 L. Erman, F. Hayes-Roth, V. Lesser and R. Reddy, The Hearsay-II speech-understanding 
system: integrating knowledge to resolve uncertainty, Comput. Surv. 12 (1980) 213-253. 
[14] E.A. Feigenbaum, A personal view of expert systems: looking back and looking ahead, Expert 
Syst. Appl. 5 (1992) 193-201. 
[I51 E.A. Feigenbaum, B.G. Buchanan and J. Lederberg. On generality and problem solving: a case 
study using the DENDRAL program, in: B. Meltzer and D. Michie, eds., Machine Intelligence 6 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1971). 
[16] R.E. Fikes and N.J. Nilsson, STRIPS: a new approach to the application of theorem proving to 
problem solving, Artif. Intell. 2 (1971) 198-208. 
[17] A. Garvey and V Lesser, Design-to-time real-time scheduling, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. 
23 (1993). 
364 B. Hayes-Roth I Ariijicial Intelligence 72 (f Y95) 329-365 
[1X] A. Georgeff and A. Lansky. Reactive reasoning and planning, in: Proceedings AAAI-87, Seattle, 
WA (1987). 
[ 191 K. Hammond, Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task (Academic Press, 
Boston, MA. 1989). 
[ZO] B. Hayes-Roth, A blackboard architecture for control, Artif. Infell. 26 (1985) 251-321. 
[21] B. Hayes-Roth, Architectural foundations for real-time performance in intelligent agents, Real- 
Time Syst. Int. J. Time-Critical Comput. Syst. 2 (1990) 99-125. 
[22] B. Hayes-Roth, On building integrated cognitive agents: a review of Newell’s Unified Theories of 
Cognition, Artif Intell. 59 (1993) 213-220. 
[23] B. Hayes-Roth, Opportunistic control of action, IEEE Trans. Sysr. Man Cybern. (to appear). 
1241 B. Hayes-Roth, P. Lalanda, P. Morignot, M. Balabanovic and K. Pfleger, Plans and behavior in 
intelligent agents, Stanford University Tech. Report, Stanford, CA (1994). 
[25] B. Hayes-Roth, R. Washington, D. Ash. A. Collinot, A. Vina and A. Seiver. Guardian: a 
prototype intensive care monitoring agent, J. Artif. Infell. Med. (to appear). 
[26] B. Hayes-Roth, R. Washington, R. Hewett, M. Hewett and A. Seiver, Intelligent real-time 
1271 
P81 
v91 
[301 
[311 
[321 
[331 
t341 
[351 
1361 
[371 
[381 
(391 
L401 
[411 
1421 
[431 
[441 
I451 
I461 
monitoring and control. in: Proceedings lJCA/-89, Detroit, MI (1989). 
J. Hendler and A. Agrawala, Mission critical planning: AI on the MARUTI real-time operating 
system, in: Proceedings Workshop on Innovative Approaches to Planning, Scheduling, and 
Conrrol (1990) 77-84. 
T. lwasaki and H.A. Simon, Causality in device behavior, Artif Infell. 29 (1986) 3-32. 
V. Jagannathan, R. Dodhiawala and L. Baum, eds., Blackboard Architectures and Applications 
(Academic Press, Boston. MA, 1989). 
M.V. Johnson and B. Hayes-Roth, Integrating diverse reasoning methods in the BBl blackboard 
control architecture, in: Proceedings IJCAI-87, Milan, Italy (1987). 
J.L. Kolodner. Retrieval and Organizational Strategies in Conceptual Memory: A Computer 
Model (Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1984). 
J.E. Laird, A. Newell and P.S. Rosenbloom, Soar: an architecture for general intelligence, Artif 
lntefl. 33 (1987) l-64. 
D. Lenat and E.A. Feigenbaum, On the thresholds of knowledge, Artif Intell. 47 (1991) 
185-250. 
T.M. Mitchell, J.F. Allen, P. Chalasani, J. Cheng, 0. Etzioni, M. Ringuette and J. Schlimmer, 
Theo: a framework for self-improving systems, in: K. VanLehn, ed., Architectures for Inreffigence 
(Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1991). 
J.L. Murdock and B. Hayes-Roth, Intelligent monitoring and control of semiconductor manufac- 
turing, IEEE Expert 6 (1991) 19-31. 
D.J. Musliner, E.H. Durfee and K.G. Shin, CIRCA: a cooperative intelligent real-time control 
architecture, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. 23 (1993). 
A. Newell, Unified Theories of Cognition (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990). 
N.J. Nilsson, Action networks, Tech. Report, Stanford, CA (1989). 
W. Pardee, M. Shaff and B. Hayes-Roth, Intelligent control of complex materials processes, J. 
Arrif. Intell. Eng. Design Autom. Manufacturing 4 (1990) 55-65. 
J. Pearl, Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks, Arfif Infell. 29 (1986) 241-288. 
C.K. Riesbeck and R.C. Schank, Inside Case-Based Reasoning (Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 
NJ, 1989). 
S.J. Rosenschein and L.P. Kaelbling, The synthesis of digital machines with provable epistemic 
properties. in: Proceedings Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, 
Monterey, CA (1986) 83-98. 
W.J. Rugh, Analytical framework for gain scheduling, in: Proceedings American Conrrol 
Conference ( 1990). 
E.D. Sacerdoti, The non-linear nature of plans, in: Proceedings ZJCAI-75, Tblisi, Georgia 
(1975). 
M. Schoppers, Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments, in: Proceedings 
IJCAI-87, Milan, Italy (1987). 
Y. Shahar. A temporal abstraction mechanism for patient monitoring, in: Proceedings SCAMC 
(1991) 121-127. 
B. Hayes-Roth I Artificial Intelligence 72 (1995) 329-365 365 
[47] H.A. Simon, Artificial Intelligence: where has it been and where is it going? IEEE Trans. Knowl. 
Data Eng. 3 (2) (1991) 128-136. 
[48] E. Simoudis, Using case-based retrieval for customer technical support, IEEE Expert 3(2) (1992) 
7-13. 
[49] H. Sipma and B. Hayes-Roth, Model-based monitoring of dynamical systems, Tech. Report, 
Stanford, CA (to appear). 
[50] R. Washington and B. Hayes-Roth, Managing input data in real-time AI systems, in: Proceedings 
ZJCAZ-89, Detroit, MI (1989). 
[51] D.E. Wilkins, Domain-independent planning: representation and plan generation, Artif. Zntell. 22 
(1984) 269-301. 
[52] D. Zhu, Nomadic host software development environment (Unix Version 1.1) (Nomadic 
Technologies, Mountain View, CA, 1992). 
